SoK: Security Evaluation of Home-based IoT Deployments

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Alexa, unlock the front door.

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Internet of Things

4



WIRED

SUBSCRIBE

PARTNER CONTENT JASON BLOOMBERG, INTELLYX.

7 REASONS WHY THE INTERNET OF THINGS IS DOOMED







T OF THINGS IS



SUBSCRIBE

T OF THINGS IS

= KnowTechie

IoT security is a nightmare, here's what you need to know







F KnowTechie

IoT security is a nightmare, here's what you need to know





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Extinguishing the IoT







GROCERIES

ShapRite



SCRIBE





Prior Work

 Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home Applications

amazon

amazon

Prior Work

- Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home Applications
- DolphinAttack: Inaudible Voice Commands

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- Soteria: Automated IoT Safety and Security Analysis

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• Skill Squatting Attacks on Amazon Alexa

Prior Work

- Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home Applications
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- Skill Squatting Attacks on Amazon Alexa
- Rethinking Access Control and Authentication for the Home Internet of Things

amazon





• Cloud endpoints



- Cloud endpoints
- Exposed services



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- Mobile App



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- Mobile App
- Network

Wouldn't be nice to know

- Cloud endpoints
- Exposed services
- Mobile App
- Network
- Consumer report evaluation?



Overview of Prior Work



Studied Components	Mitigations	Unexplored Directions
Devices Cloud integration services Network (by association)	Patching bugs Vendor responsibility	Mobile app Cloud services Network discovery protocols User control and visibility

IoT Components





- Evaluation of IoT devices should be:
 - Objective
 - Transparent
 - Measurable
 - Reproducible



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- Device Representation
 - Media devices vs appliances



- Evaluation of IoT devices should be:
 - Objective
 - Transparent
 - Measurable
 - Reproducible
- Device Representation
 - Media devices vs appliances
- Easy to understand
 - Consumer oriented







Internet pairing



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- Configuration



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- Updateable



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- Exposed services


IoT Lab Evaluation Device

- Internet pairing
- Configuration
- Updateable
- Exposed services
 - Vulnerable Services



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UPnP services RCE vulnerability CVE-2012-5958-65 Dropbear SSH RCE vulnerability CVE-2013-4863



- Types of cloud backends
 - 1st, 3rd, or hybrid



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- 12 different backends, 1st Party
- Supports SSL v2/v3
- CVE-2013-4810 RCE JBoss Server



Simple Setup



- Permissions
 - Requested unused

Simple Setup



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- Programming errors
 - Incorrect use of crypto

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Simple Setup



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 - API keys for cloud services
- Hardcoded Crypto key • uLi4/f4+Pb39.T19
- UMENG_MESSAGE_SECRET: •

Simple Setup





- Protocols in use
 - Insecure Protocols
 - Custom Protocols



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- Encryption between
 - Device to Cloud
 - Device to Mobile App
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Scoring The Components





Scorecard system



Rating components



Independent scoring





Modular

Documented

Component Framework

Component Framework





















Device Grade	Mobile Grade	Network Grade	Cloud Grade	
80.95% (B)	69.23% (D)	89.29% (B)	57.61% (F)	
	Device			
	Harmon	n Kardon Invoke		

Device Grade	Mobile Grade	Cloud Grade	Network Grade
85.71% (B)	53.85% (F)	39.13% (F)	60.71% (D)
78.57% (C)	61.54% (D)	66.3% (D)	53.57% (F)
80.95% (B)	61.54% (D)	93.48% (A)	53.57% (F)

Device	Device Grade	Mobile Grade	Cloud Grade	Network Grade
Belkin Netcam	85.71% (B)	53.85% (F)	39.13% (F)	60.71% (D)
Belkin WeMo Link	78.57% (C)	61.54% (D)	66.3% (D)	53.57% (F)
Belkin WeMo Motion Sensor	80.95% (B)	61.54% (D)	93.48% (A)	53.57% (F)







Device	Device Grade 🔹	Mobile Grade 🔶	Cloud Grade 🔶	Network Grade
Canary	92.86% (A)	100% (A)	83.7% (B)	100% (A)

Evaluation Takeaways




Evaluation Takeaways





- Cloud managed
- Auto update
- Encrypted local traffic with authenticated services

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What's Next?

4:56 Wed, 4 February



5

System update

New system software is available. Tap to learn more.

Requests pending You have 2 requests waiting.

4:55 pm

위



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What's Next?

- Longitudinal analysis
 - Do updates improve the Things?



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What's Next?

- Longitudinal analysis
 - Do updates improve the Things?
- Accurate representation
 - Inducing device activities

4:56 Wed, 4 February System update New system software is available. Tap to learn more. Requests pending 4:55 pm C× You have 2 requests waiting. R X • 2 2 1

How Can You Access/Contribute?

- Evaluation data is public
- Feel free to reach out:
 - Request specific device evaluation
 - Sponsor devices for evaluation
 - Additional questions
- Download our data
 - <u>https://YourThings.info</u>
- Contact email:
 - <u>contact@YourThings.info</u>

